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Abstract 
This study compares the evidence on corruption between alternative data sets. These include the 
Corruption Perceptions Indices (CPI) that are conventionally used and the micro data sets from the 
International Crime Victim Surveys (ICVS) and the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES) that 
have been used in recent applications. While a comparison between the evidence from the CPI and 
WBES constitutes a comparison of perception versus reality, the comparison of evidence from ICVS 
and WBES can be construed as a comparison of individual with business corruption. The study finds 
several similarities and differences between the pictures on corruption yielded by the alternative data 
sets. For example, while in case of low income countries, perception of business corruption seems to 
be worse than that based on firms’ actual experience of doing business there, the reverse is true for 
high income countries. The magnitude of individual corruption is consistently lower than that of 
business corruption, with the gap between the two forms of corruption closing only for high income 
countries. As a country develops and commercial transactions increase, the mix of corruption changes 
in favour of business corruption. While the study finds evidence of a negative association between per 
capita GNP and corruption rates, none of the three data sets provides any evidence of negative 
association between growth and corruption rates. The study also finds that while improvement in 
human development indicators such as literacy are effective instruments in controlling individual 
corruption, the strengthening of  institutions such as the legal system and the regulatory mechanism 
are likely to be more effective in combating business corruption. The strengthening of trust, whether 
via improved literacy and development of social networks or via a strong legal system, and an 
effective and transparent regulatory mechanism is the key to combating both forms of corruption. A 
methodological contribution of this study is the combination of the information of the characteristics 
of the respondent with the country level indicators in analysing the determinants of corruption. A 
significant difference between the two forms of corruption is that, after controlling for the 
respondent’s attributes and the country indicators, while individual corruption showed an increase 
over time, this was not the case with business corruption. The importance of introducing the country 
effects is seen from the sign reversal of the time coefficient estimate that occurs in case of both 
individual and business corruption once we control for the effects of the country of residence of the 
respondent. The overall message of this study is that the authorities need to distinguish between 
different forms of corruption in devising policy intervention. As the mix of individual and business 
corruption changes with economic development, so should the mix of policy instruments in tackling 
corruption. The results also underline the need to undertake more studies that investigate the 
sensitivity of the evidence on corruption to alternative data sets. 
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Does the Evidence on Corruption Depend on how it is measured? Results 
from a Cross Country Study on Micro Data sets 
 
1.  Introduction. 
Corruption has existed in one form or another for a very long time. As Bardhan (1997) 
quoting from Kautilya’s treatise on public administration in India in the fourth century BC 
points out, corruption dates back to very ancient times. However, the subject has attracted 
considerable attention from social scientists, especially economists, only recently with a 
proliferation of papers and monographs on the causes and effects of corruption. A key factor 
behind the economists’ interest in corruption has been the influential paper by Mauro (1995) 
who found that corruption had a detrimental effect on economic development by reducing a 
country’s growth rate.
1 Surveys of the literature on the economics of corruption can be found 
in Bardhan (1997), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Jain (2001) and Mishra (2005).  
The proliferating literature on corruption must be set against a background of increasing 
concern in the donor countries that the effectiveness of aid to developing countries was being 
severely curtailed by endemic corruption in many of the poorest aid recipients. The concern 
was echoed by the then World Bank President, James Wolfensohn, who in his Foreword to 
the WDR, 1997 [World Bank (1997)], argued for the need to “provide restraint to check 
existing and corrupt behaviour” (p. iii). The principal questions that the empirical literature 
on corruption has tried to address are: what are the principal determinants of corruption? 
What are the economic consequences of corruption?   
The earlier studies on corruption used the perception based measures of corruption. A 
prominent example is Mauro (1995)’s study which used the Business International Index (BI) 
of corruption which was based on standard questionnaires completed by BI correspondents in 
about seventy counties. The other perception based measure, which has been more widely 
used, is Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI). The CPI has, 
generally, been favoured over the BI since, unlike the latter it does not rely on a single data 
source but combines alternative indices of bureaucratic honesty.
2 Nevertheless, both these 
indices share the limitations of the perception based measures in suffering from the biases of 
the respondents in their evaluation of corruption in a country. For example, until recently, in 
case of many of the poorer countries the CPI was based on the subjective beliefs of Western 
businessmen who did not reside in the country they were evaluating .This introduces cultural 
and other biases that are likely to influence the results. 
                                                            
1 Shaw, Katsaiti and Jurgilas (2006) show however that Mauro’s results suffer from non robustness and that 
“after identifying an instrument with sufficient strength [they] fail to reject a zero effect on investment and 
economic growth”. 
2 Lambsdorff (2006) contains a detailed description and review of the Corruption Perception Index published by 
the Transparency International. See, also, the other contributions in Sampsford, et. al. (2006) for a wider 
perspective on the issues in the measurement of corruption.   4
The concern over the biases in the perception based measures of corruption has led to the use 
of micro data sets that provide cardinal scores of corruption based on survey data. Recent 
examples include Swamy, et. al. (2001), Svensson (2003), Dabla-Norris, et. al. (2008), and  
Mocan (2008). These data sets, which include the International Crime Victim Surveys 
(ICVS) and the World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES), consist of unit records containing 
the response of individuals and firms to questions on whether they were asked for bribes. 
Besides being more objective than the perception based measures used in the earlier 
literature, the micro data sets allow an examination of the role of the individual or the firm’s 
characteristics in explaining the behavioural unit’s experience on corruption in a manner that 
was not possible with the earlier perception based aggregate responses. Consequently, while 
the earlier studies could not go beyond the country level determinants of corruption, the 
recent micro data based literature provides richer insights into the determinants of corruption. 
However, even micro data sets such as ICVS and WBES have their limitations since their 
questionnaires were not specifically designed to obtain information on corruption. 
Consequently, there has been a further move in recent studies [see, for example, Olken (2007, 
2008), Cameron, et. al. (2007)] to use data from experiments that are specifically designed to 
elicit the participant’s attitude to corruption. These data sets also suffer from biases that result 
from the selection of individuals for the experiments, the subjective and cultural biases of the 
persons designing the experiments and from the typically small sample sizes and limited 
variation in the sample characteristics. 
The empirical evidence on corruption supports the concern of the donor countries in pointing 
to several adverse social and economic consequences of corruption. Mauro (1995) found that 
corruption has a negative impact on economic growth by lowering investment. Mauro’s 
results were confirmed by Li, et. al. (2000), though they found the negative effect of 
corruption on growth to be much weaker. Shaw, et. al. (2006) go a step further and observe 
that, with the use of stronger instruments than the ethnolinguistic fractionalisation (ELF) that 
Mauro (1995) uses  to tackle the endogeneity issue, the adverse effect of corruption on 
growth and investment disappears completely. Gupta et. al. (2002) found that high corruption 
increases inequality and poverty. In a contradictory result, Li. et. al. (2000) find that there is 
an inverted U shaped relationship between corruption and income inequality with high 
corruption countries having low inequality. In contrast to both these studies, You and 
Khagram (2005) find that the causal link runs from inequality to corruption rather than the 
other way with inequality increasing the level of corruption. This study is part of a large 
literature mostly based on the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index that 
analyses the determinants of corruption on cross country data. This   literature includes the 
studies of Treisman (2000), Paldam (2002), Fisman and Gatti (2002), and Montinola and 
Jackman (2002).The results establish the significance of a variety of factors as determinants 
of corruption. For example, Montinola and Jackman (2002) find a non linear relationship 
between corruption and political competition, with democratic practices inhibiting corruption 
only beyond a threshold level. Fisman and Gatti (2002) found that fiscal decentralisation 
leads to lower corruption. There is general agreement in the literature that as a country 
develops and becomes richer it experiences less corruption.   5
While the overall thrust of these findings is that corruption is an evil which constrains 
economic development and is itself the product of an underdeveloped economy, there is a 
general lack of robustness in the findings and in the precise nature of the relationships 
between corruption and its country level determinants. This raises the question posed in the 
title of this paper of whether the evidence on the magnitude, determinants and consequences 
of corruption is sensitive to the measure or data used. This question has assumed significance 
in the wake of concern over the use of perception based measures of corruption that has led to 
the increased use of micro data sets and data from specially designed experiments that 
monitor the subjects’ attitude to corruption. Olken (2008) provides a different example of 
divergence between perception and reality by noting that a villager’s perception of corruption 
on a particular road project in Indonesia differs from the general corruption in the village. 
Olken’s study confirms the presence of biases in reported perceptions and his “findings 
illustrate the limitations of relying solely on corruption perceptions”.  
The principal motivation of this study is to compare the evidence on corruption obtained from 
the CPI, ICVS and the WBES data sets. To our knowledge, a systematic comparison between 
the data sets on corruption in terms of the pictures they portray on corruption has not been 
attempted in the literature. The results assume practical significance since the robustness of 
the evidence needs to be established before policy conclusions are drawn on a subject of 
immense developmental importance. While the comparison between the summary features of 
the Transparency International’s data and the micro data sets throws light on the issue of 
perception versus reality, a comparison between the ICVS and WBES data sets provides an 
answer to the question whether individual corruption that the former measures is 
fundamentally distinct from firm level or business corruption that the latter provides 
information on
3. The empirical literature has not drawn a distinction between the two types of 
corruption though from a policy view point this distinction, if empirically supported, is 
important. This study provides alternative ways of evaluating the differences between the 
pictures on corruption that emerge from the three data sets. This study also attempts a 
comparative static exercise by presenting evidence on how the distribution of corruption 
across countries has changed over time and comparing the pictures on the temporal changes 
in world corruption that emerge from the data sets. This is done by drawing the kernel density 
graphs of corruption distribution for different years and making temporal comparisons 
between the density graphs yielded by the alternative data sets. This study also re-examines 
the widely held view that corruption constrains economic growth by investigating if this is 
equally true of individual and business corruption.  
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the three data sets that 
have been used in this study. Section 3 reports and compares their summary features. Section 
4 presents the results of estimation of the determinants of corruption on the two micro data 
sets and draws attention to some of the similarities and differences in the estimates. Section 5 
                                                            
3 In this paper, we use the term “individual corruption” to refer to the exposure of an individual to bribe 
demands in the advancement of her/his personal interests, and “business corruption” to refer to similar exposure 
of a firm to bribery in connection with business transactions.   6
widens the discussion to the issue of the causal links, if any, between a nation’s living 
standards as measured by its per capita GNP/ growth rates and corruption besides other 
factors. The robustness of Mauro’s result is re-examined on the two micro data sets. The 
issue that we examine in this Section is not simply whether the use of a different set of 
instruments will alter Mauro (1995)’s principal result of a negative relationship between 
growth rates and corruption, as some studies have done recently, but also if his result on the 
corruption perceptions data is robust to the use of other, notably micro, data sets. In keeping 
with the spirit of this study, the discussion of this section focuses on a comparison between 
the econometric evidence from the ICVS and WBES data sets. Section 6 summarises the 
principal results and concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Data Description
4 
The Transparency International (TI) Corruption Index is an initiative taken by the Berlin-
based International non-governmental organisation, together with Dr. Johann Graf 
Lambsdorff, an economist with the University of Pessau in Germany. The annual Corruption 
Perceptions Index (CPI), first released in 1995, is the best known of Transparency 
International’s tools. It has been widely credited with putting the issue of corruption on the 
international policy agenda. The CPI measures the perceived levels of public sector 
corruption in a given country and is a composite index, drawing on different expert and 
business surveys. The CPI scores countries on a scale from zero (highly corrupt) to ten 
(highly clean) by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments 
and opinion surveys. In order to maintain consistency with the micro data sets, we have 
reversed the ordering so that the scores range from zero (highly clean) to ten (highly corrupt). 
The CPI is a ‘poll of polls’, representing the average scores which individual countries have 
been given by international businessmen and financial journalists when polled in a variety of 
contexts. Evaluation of the extent of corruption is done by country experts, non residents and 
residents, non-resident business leaders from developed countries, and resident business 
leaders. To determine the mean value for a country, standardisation is carried out via a 
matching percentiles technique. This uses the ranks of countries reported for each individual 
source. This method is useful for combining sources that have a different distribution. While 
there is some information loss in this technique, it allows all reported scores to remain within 
the bounds of the CPI, i.e. between 0 and 10. Notwithstanding the scientific manner in which 
the individual scores are combined to provide an aggregate score for a country, the CPI is a 
subjective measure based on the perceptions of a limited set of respondents, mainly business 
people. Many of these respondents do not reside in the country that is being evaluated 
introducing a cultural bias which adds to the element of subjectivity in the CPI scores. 
                                                            
4 The data descriptions have been taken from the websites, www.tranparency.org,  www.unicri.it and 
www.enterprisesurveys.org .The reader is referred to these websites for further details.   7
The second data set, which provides information on civilian corruption in the context of 
dealings with public or government officials, came from the International Crime Victim 
Surveys (ICVS) that is collected by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice 
Research Institute (UNICRI). The ICVS project started in 1989. A standard set of data 
analysis tools has been developed over the years to ensure that choice of data analysis that 
have been made in the past are applied over time and also between countries. Two types of 
methodologies have been developed over the years, Cati methodology for the countries with 
high telephone penetration, and face to face methodology for the countries with low 
telephone penetration. In most cases, the latter are restricted to the capital city. This 
introduces a city bias in the responses to questions on crime and corruption in the case of 
many of the developing countries. If, as seems likely, crime and corruption in many less 
developed countries are largely restricted to the cities and the urban metropolitan centres, the 
ICVS scores are likely to suffer from an upward bias in case of the poorer countries. This is 
analogous to the cultural bias in case of the CPI scores of developing countries which is also 
likely to introduce an upward bias in corruption perception in such countries. In case of the 
industrialised countries, the response rates have shown a steady improvement over the years, 
up from a 43 % response rate in 1989 to a 67 % response rate in 1996. UNICRI was 
responsible for the face to face questionnaire and monitoring of the ICVS in the developing 
and transition countries. In 1996, the response rates in developing countries were on average 
95 %, ranging from a minimum of 86 % in Botswana to a maximum of 99 % in South Africa, 
the Philippines and Bolivia. 
The ICVS data on corruption was based on the individual’s response to the question: [During 
the past year] has any government official, for instance a customs officer, police officer or 
inspector in your own country, asked you or expected you to pay a bribe for his services? The 
responses, combined with a host of personal and household information, constituted the ICVS 
data set for this study. This information was supplemented by a set of country level 
characteristics that have been listed (with scores) in Appendix C of the paper by Dabla-
Norris, Gradstein and Inchauste (2008) and in Table 4 of the study by Mocan (2008).   
The World Bank Enterprise Surveys (WBES), which provided the third data set used in this 
study, collect information ( from the firm level surveys) about the business environment, how 
it is perceived by individual firms, how it changes over time, and about the various 
constraints to firm performance and growth. The present study is based on the responses to 
the question whether the firm made gift payments within the past year. Since this is similar to 
the question asked of individuals in the ICVS data set, this sets up a direct comparison 
between the corruption measures constructed from the ICVS and WBES. Given the nature of 
the questions in the ICVS and WBES, a comparison between a country’s corruption rates 
from these two micro data sets can be construed as a comparison between individual 
corruption (ICVS) and business corruption (WBES).   
The earliest WBES available data is from 2002 and the latest is from 2008. The 2002-06 data 
asked the following questions relating to bribe payments. [Did you make a] gift payment to 
obtain mainline telephone, electrical or water connection, construction permit, import license 
and operating license? [ Was a gift/informal payment requested]  by tax inspectorate, by   8
[agencies for] labour and social security, fire and building safety, sanitary/epidemic safety, 
environmental safety and by all [other] agencies? The 2006-08 data asked the following 
questions: Was an informal gift requested when you applied for a telephone, electrical or 
water connection, when you applied for an import license, operating license or a 
construction-related permit, or [during] tax inspections?
5 
Since the TI’s CPI and the WBES are both based on the opinions and experiences of business 
people, their corruption rates are likely to be closer to one another than to those of the ICVS, 
a feature that is confirmed by the results reported below. However, since the WBES 
information, being based on the firm’s experience, is less subjective than the perception 
based CPI, wide differences are still likely to persist between these two measures.  
 
3.  Comparison of the Summary Evidence from the Alternative Data Sets on 
Corruption 
The following points need to be kept in mind before comparing the summary evidence on 
corruption provided by the three data sets. The Corruption Perception Index, as reported by 
Transparency International, scores a country on a scale of 0-10 in descending order of 
corruption, with 10 denoting the least corrupt country and 0 the most corrupt. For consistency 
with the ICVS and WBES data sets where the respondent’s answer is binary with 1 indicating 
a bribe demand and 0 otherwise, the CPI score was modified to (10 - CPI score for that 
country) so that a higher modified CPI score indicates higher corruption. Moreover, for easy 
comparability with the country averages of corruption rates from the two micro data sets, the 
modified CPI scores were rescaled by dividing by the maximum modified CPI score so that 
the scores lie between 0 and 1. Note, however, that while the country averages from the 
ICVS, and WBES data sets denote the percentages of individuals and firms, respectively, that 
are exposed to corruption in a country, no such interpretation can be given to the modified 
CPI scores. The corruption distributions of countries from the three data sets are comparable 
since they are based on ordinal intervals of corruption.  
The average rates of corruption, calculated by country and year from the ICVS and WBES 
data sets, are presented in the Appendix tables A1 and A2 respectively. A quick glance at 
these tables indicates that civilian or individual corruption, that the ICVS measures, is 
generally much lower in magnitude than firm level or business corruption. Both these micro 
data sets generally agree that poorer and less developed countries report greater prevalence of 
corruption than the more affluent and developed countries. The cross country variation in the 
corruption statistics is, however, much smaller in case of individual corruption (ICVS) than 
for business corruption (WBES). There is no clear picture in either data set on temporal 
changes in the magnitude of corruption.                                                      
                                                            
5 When running regressions on WBES data, we use the 2002-05 dataset in order to maintain consistency on the 
definition of the dependant variable (corruption) within the WBES data. Also, for purpose of comparison among 
corruption measures, the 2002-05 WBES dataset is closer to the ICVS data under study.   9
The scatter points
6 and the quadratic fits between the country scores in the three data sets are 
presented in Figures 1-3, with each scatter point representing a combination of corruption 
scores for a particular country. To ensure that the correlation magnitudes are true measures of 
association between the country scores in the data sets, the scatter points relate to a particular 
year in case of Figure 1 (CPI vs. WBES) and Figure 2 (CPI vs. ICVS). Due to the non 
overlapping periods of their data sets, proximate years were used for a comparison between 
the ICVS and WBES country scores in Figure 3. There is generally a positive association 
between the country scores in the three data sets. A significant exception is the downward 
sloping segment of the U shaped curve in Figure 3. The association is at its strongest between 
WBES and CPI (r
2 = 0.7688) and at its weakest between ICVS and WBES (r
2 = 0.4605). This 
makes intuitive sense since, unlike the ICVS, both the CPI and the WBES country scores are 
based on the responses of business people and entrepreneurs. The Figures also show that the 
countries fare much worse on the responses of business people (CPI, WBES) than on 
individual responses (ICVS) to the corruption question. This is seen from Figure 2 where all 
the scatter points lie above the 45
o line and, still more clearly, from Figure 3 where all the 
scatter points lie below the 45
o line. The latter suggests that in all the countries that appear in 
both the micro data sets, the WBES based corruption rates exceed those based on the ICVS, 
often by a large margin.  
Fig 1: Quadratic Fit between Corruption scores from CPI and WBES 2005 
 
   
 Fig 2: Quadratic Fit between Corruption scores from CPI and ICVS 1999 
                                                            
6 STATA 9 ™ has been used to generate all graphs and all estimation results. 
   10
 
Fig 3: Quadratic Fit between Corruption scores from ICVS and WBES 
 
Further insights into the cross country comparisons on corruption can be obtained from 
Figures 4-6 which plot the kernel densities of the corruption distribution of countries 
corresponding to ICVS, WBES and the modified CPI, respectively. These graphs also show 
how the distribution has changed over time. The figures below the graphs give the principal 
statistics of these distributions. If we take the median as a summary measure of world 
corruption, then the three data sets differ on how corruption has changed over time. While the 
ICVS records a marginal decline in world corruption between 1995 and 1999, the modified 
CPI records a sharp increase during this period. The latter records a further increase in world 
corruption between 1999 and 2006 notwithstanding a marginal decline between 1999 and 
2005. In contrast, the WBES records a continuous decline in world corruption during the 
period 2002-2006.
7 Though some of the temporal movement in the measures could be 
attributed to the fact that the CPI was constructed from the corruption perception of a wider 
selection of respondents [see Lambsdorff (2006)] and that the WBES was based on a more 
                                                            
7 The choice of the years for Kernel density analysis is based on the years which have the higher number of 
observations (1995 and 1999 for ICVS and 2002, 2005 and 2006 for WBES).   11
limited set of questions on gift payments in the later years, it is not unreasonable to conclude 
that the three measures differ fundamentally on temporal changes in the magnitude of 
severity of world corruption. The kernel distributions show much greater temporal movement 
in case of the WBES than the modified CPI, and the least movement in case of the ICVS data 
set.  
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Summary Statistics of ICVS Corruption Distribution 
ICVS  No. of 
Obs 
Mean Max Min Range Standard 
Deviation
Variance Median Skewness Kurtosis
ICVS, 1995  32  0.106  0.299  0.001 0.298 0.094  0.009 0.078  5.24E-01  2.045 
ICVS, 1999  41  0.100  0.591  0.000 0.591 0.119  0.014 0.055  1.95E+00  8.331 
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Summary Statistics of WBES Corruption Distribution   12
WBES  No. of 
Obs 
Mean Max Min Range Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Median Skewness Kurtosis
WBES, 2002  37 0.658  0.929  0.165 0.765  0.152  0.023 0.676  -7.64E-01  4.274 
WBES, 2005  42 0.602  0.871  0.180 0.691  0.179  0.032 0.636  -4.99E-01  2.526 
WBES, 2006  35 0.387  0.918  0.040 0.878  0.175  0.031 0.408  7.82E-01  4.986 
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Mean Max  Min  Range 
Standard 
Deviation 
Variance Median Skewness  Kurtosis
CPI, 1995  16 0.375  0.806  0.088  0.718  0.264  0.070 0.294  4.18E-01  1.593 
CPI, 1999  20 0.667  0.830  0.480  0.350  0.097  0.009 0.665  -3.05E-01  2.242 
CPI, 2005  30 0.592  0.780  0.180  0.600  0.166  0.028 0.645  -9.82E-01  2.902 
CPI, 2006  31 0.675  0.810  0.270  0.540  0.129  0.017 0.730  -1.72E+00  5.295 
 
Figure 7 allows a ready comparison of the corruption distribution of countries between the 
alternative data sets by plotting the kernel densities in the same Figure. The corruption 
distribution of countries implied by the WBES and the modified CPI measures are closer to 
one another than to that corresponding to the ICVS. Figure 7 confirms that the evidence on 
corruption based on the individuals’ responses in the ICVS data points to a less pessimistic 
picture than those based on the responses of the business people. For example, according to 
the ICVS, 1999, on median based average, 5.5 % of individuals globally were asked to pay a 
bribe while, according to the WBES, 2005, the comparable figure for firms is 63.6%. The two 
rates of corruption are not necessarily inconsistent. For example, an individual is much less 
likely to be exposed to bribe requests to advance her/his personal interests than a firm will be 
in business transactions. A comparison of the modified CPI density graphs in 1999 and 2005 
confirms the decrease in the perception of corruption in the early years of the 21
st century. A 
comparison of the kernel density graphs of the WBES and CPI in 2005 reinforces the view   13
that the business people’s perception of corruption is worse than the actual experience of 
corruption by the resident firms in those countries. 
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Comparative Summary Statistics of Corruption Distribution 
Corruption  No. of 
Obs 
Mean Max  Min  Range Standard 
Deviation
Variance Median Skewness Kurtosis
ICVS, 1999  41 0.100 0.591 0.000  0.591 0.119  0.014  0.055  1.95E+00  8.331 
CPI, 1999  20 0.667 0.830 0.480  0.350 0.097  0.009  0.665  -3.05E-01  2.242 
CPI, 2005  30 0.592 0.780 0.180  0.600 0.166  0.028  0.645  -9.82E-01  2.902 
WBES, 2005  42 0.602 0.871 0.180  0.691 0.179  0.032  0.636  -4.99E-01  2.526 
 
Does corruption decline as a country becomes more affluent, and her regulatory and detection 
mechanisms display greater sophistication? Figure 8 provides comparative evidence on this 
issue from the three data sets by plotting the country scores against their per capita GNP at 
purchasing power parity. While the three measures generally agree that corruption decreases 
as a country gets richer, there are differences between the graphs on the nature and extent of 
the decline. The modified CPI registers a steady and sharp decline throughout the process of 
economic development unlike the more objective measures based on the micro data sets. The 
WBES graph shows that, after a very marginal decline in corruption in the early stages of 
economic development, the rate of decline increases for middle income countries and exceeds 
the rate of decline shown by the modified CPI measure for high income countries. The ICVS 
based corruption measure behaves quite differently. Much of the decline takes place in the 
early stages of economic development but, then, the graph flattens out with individual 
corruption becoming virtually nonexistent in the more advanced countries. Figure 8 is 
consistent with the kernel density graphs of Figure 7 in confirming that the evidence on 
corruption from the CPI and WBES are closer to one another than to that from the ICVS. 
This is further confirmation that business corruption is more serious and of higher order than 
individual corruption. The empirical literature on corruption does not usually distinguish 
between the two though the present evidence points to the need to do so.   14
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Figures 9 – 12 provide further insights by plotting the relationship between the corruption 
scores and per capita GNP at PPP separately for the four quartile groups in the corruption 
distribution of countries reported earlier. The figures correspond to the quartiles in increasing 
order, with Figure 9 referring to the least corrupt countries and Figure 12 the most corrupt 
countries. It is interesting to note that none of the ICVS scatter points appears in Figure 9 
though, overall, ICVS points to lower world corruption than the modified CPI and WBES 
based measures. These figures show that the decline in corruption with economic 
development is largely restricted to countries in quartile 1, i.e. the least corrupt countries. 
There is not much evidence of an inverse relation between corruption and per capita GNP for 
the most corrupt countries. Figures 11 and 12 show a reversal of the graphs corresponding to 
the modified CPI and WBES. Corruption perception, that the modified CPI quantifies, is 
worse than corruption experience, that the WBES quantifies, in the moderately corrupt 
countries of quartile 3 shown in Figure 11, but the reverse is the case for the most corrupt 
countries of quartile 4 shown in Figure 12.    15
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The overall message conveyed by the Figures is that the inverse relationship between 
corruption and living standards as measured by per capita GNP does not hold uniformly 
across countries in various stages of development nor is there uniformity in the portrayal of 
this relationship by the alternative measures. The widely held belief based on the CPI 
measure put out by Transparency International that corruption rates decline monotonically 
and sharply as a country develops is not supported by the evidence from the ICVS and the 
WBES data sets. Both the micro data sets suggest non monotonicity in this relationship but 
disagree on its shape. While ICVS suggests that the decline in the corruption rates as the 
country enjoys higher living standards occurs at the lower levels of development and then 
peters out and even registers a slight increase at very high income levels, the WBES based 
evidence suggests the reverse. Given the nature of the ICVS and the WBES data, an 
alternative interpretation of this result could be that as a country develops and witnesses 
higher living standards, corruption faced by the individuals in their dealings with public 
officials initially starts to decline followed by a decline in business corruption at the higher 
levels of development. This raises the question of whether the evidence on corruption acting 
as a constraint on economic development based on the CPI holds on the micro data sets. We 
visit this issue in the penultimate section where we report the results of regressing per capita 
income and growth on a host of determinants including the corruption rates on the micro data 
sets and focus attention on some key differences in the estimates. 
 
4.  Comparison of the Determinants of Individual and Business Corruption. 
Tables 1 and 2 report the probit estimates of the corruption regression on the ICVS and 
WBES data sets, respectively, with a selection of the personal characteristics and 
characteristics of the country of residence of the respondent included as determinants of the 
respondent’s probability of being asked to pay a bribe. A time variable was introduced to 
capture the effects of omitted variables that vary over time. The tables also report the probit 
coefficient estimates in the absence of the country indicator effects. While a comparison 
between the pseudo R
2 values in each table confirms the presence of significant country   17
effects in explaining corruption, the inclusion of the country variables leads to a loss of 
statistical significance in case of some of the respondent’s characteristics due to the loss of 
observations. A comparison between Tables 1 and 2 allows an examination of possible 
differences between the determinants of individual and business corruption. Such a 
comparison, which is a significant point of departure of the present study from the previous 
literature, adds to the summary evidence presented in the previous section on key differences 
between the two types of corruption. 








SE z  P>|z|  Coefficients
c 
Robust 
SE z  P>|z| 
smalltown -0.7064  *  0.0204  -34.58  0.000 -0.2257 *  0.0359  -6.29  0.0000 
medtown -0.0297  **  0.0150  -1.98  0.047 -0.1649 *  0.0328  -5.03  0.0000 
male 0.2992  *** 0.0145  20.61  0.000 0.3326 *  0.0225  14.78  0.0000 
age1 0.6191  *** 0.0346  17.91  0.000 0.5659 *  0.0547  10.34  0.0000 
age2 0.3779  *** 0.0324  11.66  0.000 0.3559 *  0.0507  7.02  0.0000 
single 0.4881  **  0.2381  2.05  0.040 4.3902 *  0.3652  12.02  0.0000 
married 0.7054  *  0.2379  2.97  0.003 4.5172 *  0.3646  12.39  0.0000 
livtog 0.6514  *  0.2395  2.72  0.007 4.4630 *  0.3679  12.13  0.0000 
divorced 0.6318  *  0.2397  2.64  0.008 4.5140 *  0.3687  12.24  0.0000 
widow 0.7854  *  0.2402  3.27  0.001 4.6127 *  0.3693  12.49  0.0000 
working -0.3892  *  0.0349  -11.14  0.000 -0.0380 0.0783  -0.49  0.6270 
lookwork -0.2588  *  0.0397  -6.51  0.000 0.0195 0.0845  0.23  0.8170 
keephome -0.3943  *  0.0403  -9.79  0.000 -0.1228 0.0855  -1.44  0.1510 
retired -0.6480  *  0.0456  -14.20  0.000 -0.2995 *  0.0894  -3.35  0.0010 
atschool -0.1067  **  0.0424  -2.52  0.012 -0.0915 0.0867  -1.05  0.2910 
inc1 0.1677  *  0.0241  6.97  0.000 0.1871 *  0.0523  3.58  0.0000 
inc2 0.0696  *  0.0239  2.91  0.004 0.0518 0.0516  1.00  0.3150 
edu_yrs 0.0098  *  0.0018  5.50  0.000 0.0257 *  0.0027  9.47  0.0000 
icvs_t -0.0495  *  0.0036  -13.56  0.000 0.0335 *  0.0075  4.46  0.0000 
reg_burden           -396.4677  *  34.6570 -11.44  0.0000 
hdi           -10.7713  *  0.3133  -34.38  0.0000 
literacy          -0.0789  *  0.0049  -15.98  0.0000 
lpop           -0.0976  *  0.0100  -9.73  0.0000 
unempl          -0.0065  0.0043  -1.52  0.1290 
Deap          -0.2293  *  0.0479  -4.79  0.0000 
Dla           0.6771  *  0.0428  15.80  0.0000 
_cons -1.9485  *  0.2454  -7.94  0.000 3.7394 .  .  . 
Number of           91574  Number of obs                      66922 
Log Pseudolikelihood                                                      -20612.644  Log Pseudolikelihood                                             -8416.7304 
Pseudo R
2           0.105  Pseudo R
2                   0.2518 
a. ICVS is 1 if asked for a bribe, 0 otherwise. b. See Appendix Table A3 for meaning of the variable names. 
c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Consistent with the results presented in Swamy, et. al. (2001) and Mocan (2008), Table1 
shows that a male is more likely than a female to be asked for a bribe. Residents of the 
smaller towns and cities (i.e. with a population below 1 million) are less likely to receive 
bribe demands than those residing in the more populated areas. The smaller the place of 
residence the greater is the vulnerability of the individual to bribe demands. This is due to the 
fact that the residents of the smaller towns and cities have fewer contacts with government 
officials and are less reliant on civic authorities for their daily existence compared to the 
residents of the larger cities. Retired individuals are less likely to be exposed to bribes than   18
those working. These results have been explained by Hunt (2004) as reflecting the absence of 
informal networking and quid pro quo in case of residents of the more populated regions and 
the working individuals. As Hunt (2004) points out, the networking system can prevent 
corruption through the establishment of personalised contact and trust
8 leading to the 
possibility of quid pro quo substituting bribery. Table 1 also reports that income and 
educational advancements increase the individual’s exposure to bribe demands reflecting the 
fact that government officials are more likely to approach resource rich and more educated 
individuals with bribe demands rather than the poor or the less educated. 
A striking feature of the results of Table 1 is the high significance recorded by nearly all the 
country variables in their effects on individual corruption. This is a result of immense policy 
significance for it points to effective policy instruments for reducing corruption. For example, 
an increase in the regulatory requirements in the respondent’s country of residence leads to a 
sharp decrease in individual corruption. Improvements in the indicator of human 
development and in the literacy level of the respondent’s country of residence also help to 
reduce individual corruption. This is a positive result since it shows that greater social 
awareness that results from increasing literacy and other aspects of human development sets 
up barriers to the spread of corruption. Consequently, as Table 1 reports, countries in the Asia 
Pacific region that have made impressive gains in the human development indicators have 
witnessed lower levels of individual corruption than elsewhere. The same cannot be said of 
the Latin American countries where the advances of the human development indicators have 
been far less impressive resulting in such countries witnessing greater levels of individual 
corruption than elsewhere. While population size has a strong negative effect on individual 
corruption, higher unemployment also tends to dampen the existence of individual corruption 
though the latter effect is much weaker in both size and significance. It is worth noting that 
the regulatory requirements, the human development indicator and the literacy level of the 
respondent’s country of residence stand out among the country variables in regard to the size 
and significance of their effects in reducing the culture of individual corruption. The time 
variable is also highly significant suggesting that, after controlling for the other determinants, 
there has been an increase in individual corruption over the period considered for the ICVS 
surveys (1995-1999). 
Table 2 extends the results of Dabla-Norris, et. al. (2008) on informal economic activity 
based on the WBES data to bribe demands. An increase in the education level of the top 
manager is likely to increase the firm’s exposure to bribe payments, analogous to the result in 
Table 1 that higher education increases the citizen’s susceptibility to individual corruption. 
However, unlike in the case of individuals in their dealings with public officials, an increase 
in the firm’s income level reduces its exposure to bribery. The net working explanation of 
Hunt (2004) possibly holds here as well. Firms in the higher income groups are fewer in 
number and are better placed to form networks and cartels that reduce their exposure to 
corruption. Similarly, foreign owned firms who have less contacts and net works for quid pro 
                                                            
8 See, for example, Knack and Zak (2003) for a discussion of the positive role played by interpersonal trust in 
promoting economic growth and development.    19
quo in the country of business than the locally owned firms are more exposed to corruption. 
Increasing confidence by the firm in the country’s judicial system reduces business 
corruption. A firm that views corruption as a severe constraint on the growth of its business 
or regulatory policy uncertainty as an impediment to its operations faces increased exposure 
to bribes. A firm that views the existing labour regulations as a severe constraint on its 
business operations is more vulnerable to bribe demands. Another interesting result is that a 
firm that takes a pessimistic view of macroeconomic uncertainty in its effect on the firm’s 
business operations is less likely to face business corruption. 








SE z  P>|z|  Coefficients
c 
Robust 
SE z  P>|z| 
size 0.0661  **  0.0258  2.56  0.0100 0.0385  0.0350  1.1  0.2710 
firmage -0.0061  *  0.0012  -5.24  0.0000  -0.0023  0.0014  -1.64  0.1010 
edu_topmngr 0.0431  *  0.0115  3.74  0.0000 0.0590  *  0.0142  4.14  0.0000 
female_pc 0.0015  * 0.0006  2.68  0.0070 -0.0006  0.0007  -0.77  0.4390 
conf_justice -0.0907  *  0.0110  -8.26 0.0000 -0.0428  *  0.0138  -3.09  0.0020 
DEffGovt -0.0862  **  0.0409  -2.11  0.0350 -0.1096  ***  0.0601  -1.82  0.0680 
BClegalsyst 0.0311  **  0.0140  2.22 0.0260 0.0045  0.0184  0.24  0.8070 
BCanticomp -0.0125  0.0137  -0.92 0.3600 0.0284  0.0187  1.52  0.1280 
BCcrime -0.0516  *  0.0144  -3.59  0.0000 -0.0290  0.0190  -1.53  0.1260 
BCcorrupt 0.1145  * 0.0151  7.57  0.0000 0.0889  *  0.0200  4.44  0.0000 
BCinstable -0.0752  * 0.0151  -4.97  0.0000 -0.0423  **  0.0205  -2.07  0.0390 
BCpolicy 0.0584  *  0.0157  3.73  0.0000 0.0559  *  0.0208  2.7  0.0070 
BClic 0.0896  *  0.0140  6.4  0.0000 0.0749  *  0.0178  4.21  0.0000 
BClabregu 0.0188  0.0138  1.36  0.1720 0.0571  *  0.0187  3.05  0.0020 
income -0.5768  *  0.0315  -18.29  0.0000 -0.4412  *  0.0843  -5.23  0.0000 
Dexport 0.1000  **  0.0412  2.42  0.0150 -0.0184  0.0525  -0.35  0.7260 
Dforeign 0.0181  0.0529  0.34  0.7330 0.1559  **  0.0751  2.08  0.0380 
wbes_t 0.2440  *  0.0265  9.2  0.0000  -0.2100 **  0.0995  -2.11  0.0350 
Deap           -0.5451  *  0.1411  -3.86  0.0000 
Dla           -1.1923  *  0.1575  -7.57  0.0000 
rol          -0.0400  0.1931  -0.21  0.8360 
hdi          0.2751  1.6332  0.17  0.8660 
literacy           -0.0185  **  0.0077  -2.39  0.0170 
lpop           0.0193  0.0324  0.6  0.5500 
unempl           -0.0778  *  0.0146  -5.33  0.0000 
_cons -0.5103  *  0.0919  -5.55  0.000 0.8778  0.8669  1.01  0.3110 
Number of obs                      10016  Number of                  7316 
Log Pseudolikelihood                                                               -3608.8416  Log Pseudolikelihood                             -2229.1261 
Pseudo R
2                          0.1074  Pseudo R
2                        0.1343 
a. WBES is 1 if asked for a bribe, 0 otherwise. b. See Appendix Table A3 for meaning of the variable names.     
c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The policy message from Table 2 is clear: an effective way of reducing business corruption is 
by altering the perceptions of the key decision makers of the unit of operations. Greater 
transparency in dealing with corruption, convincing the firm that the authorities are 
determined to weed out corruption thus altering its views on corruption as a serious 
impediment to its activities, simpler regulatory mechanisms, and the reduction of uncertainty   20
can be effective in eliminating business corruption
9. Unlike in the case of individual 
corruption, gender matters little in business corruption as is clear from the statistical 
insignificance of the estimated gender composition variable in the presence of the country 
effects. This is in sharp contrast to the significance of the gender coefficient estimate in 
Table1. As with the results for individual corruption presented in Table1, the nature and 
statistical significance of the effects of the respondent’s characteristics are generally robust to 
the introduction of the country variables. Similar to the case of individual corruption, several 
country indicators are significant determinants of business corruption. Note however that the 
country effects are generally weaker and much less significant in case of business corruption 
than for individual corruption discussed earlier. An increase in the country’s unemployment 
rate and in the literacy level of the firm’s country of operations lead to declines in business 
corruption An improvement in the country’s human development indicator does not have any 
significant impact on business corruption in contrast to its role in reducing individual 
corruption. Another interesting contrast between the results in Tables 1 and 2 is that while the 
Latin American countries have experienced lower levels of business corruption than 
elsewhere, the reverse was seen to be the case for individual corruption. A possible 
explanation could be that the human development indicators where Latin American countries 
have shown less progress than elsewhere seem to matter much less in case of business 
corruption than in case of individual corruption. Note, also, that after controlling for the 
respondent’s characteristics and the country variables, business corruption did not show any 
significant increase over time during the period of consideration for the WBES data sets 
(2002-2006) unlike the increase registered by individual corruption. It is interesting to note 
that, in case of both the micro data sets, the coefficient estimate of the time variable changes 
sign, though in reverse directions, once we introduce the country effects. For example, the 
decline in individual corruption recorded by the ICVS based summary measures reported 
below Figure 4 is merely the reflection of corruption declining as development proceeded and 
the countries became more affluent. Once these are controlled for, there was a net increase in 
individual corruption.  
To sum up, Tables 1 and 2 reveal several similarities and contrasts between the determinants 
of government and business corruption. While both types of corruption can be tackled by 
improvement in a country’s legal and regulatory mechanisms and in her literacy levels, other 
aspects of human development play a much greater role in reducing individual corruption 
than in controlling business corruption. A transparent regulatory policy that changes the 
firm’s perception of corruption as an impediment to its operations can go a long way in 
controlling business corruption. In a perverse sort of way, increasing unemployment dampens 
business corruption but has little effect on individual corruption. In an era where developing 
countries are in need of greater investment by foreign firms, the present results suggest that 
policy initiatives should include encouraging such firms to develop local contacts and 
participate in local networks in order to reduce their greater exposure to bribe demands. 
                                                            
9  Shleifer and Vishny (1993) also emphasise the role of government institutions and regulatory mechanisms in 
controlling corruption.    21
The probit estimates in Tables 1 and 2 are likely to suffer from bias if one or more of the 
country variables are correlated with variables that, also, influence the respondent’s answer to 
the question on bribery. To examine the robustness of the regression results presented so far, 
Tables 3 and 4 present the IV probit coefficient estimates. In case of the ICVS data set, the 
country variables, Regulatory burden, HDI and Literacy are instrumented, while in case of 
the WBES data, Rule of Law, HDI and Literacy are instrumented. These country indicators 
were instrumented by Freedom of Press, Economic Freedom and Female/Male ratio which 
are all available at the country level. The choice of these instrumental variables was guided 
by the prime consideration for a good instrument, namely, that they are correlated with the 
country variables that are potentially endogenous but they do not influence the respondent’s 
exposure to corruption.    




c Robust  SE z  P>|z| 
reg_burden -201.3896  ***  121.2927  -1.66  0.0970 
hdi -10.6694  *  0.3885  -27.46  0.0000 
literacy -0.1420  *  0.0128  -11.12  0.0000 
smalltown -0.3361  *  0.0461  -7.29  0.0000 
medtown -0.2592  *  0.0502  -5.16  0.0000 
male 0.3321  *  0.0227  14.66  0.0000 
age1 0.5890  *  0.0558  10.55  0.0000 
age2 0.3719  *  0.0520  7.15  0.0000 
single 4.4772  *  0.4084  10.96  0.0000 
married 4.6000  *  0.4103  11.21  0.0000 
livtog 4.5183  *  0.4150  10.89  0.0000 
divorced 4.5790  *  0.4134  11.08  0.0000 
widow 4.6850  *  0.4126  11.35  0.0000 
working -0.0701  0.0786  -0.89  0.3730 
lookwork 0.0221  0.0844  0.26  0.7930 
keephome -0.1277  0.0868  -1.47  0.1410 
retired -0.3420  *  0.0910  -3.76  0.0000 
atschool -0.1285  0.0876  -1.47  0.1430 
inc1 0.1782  *  0.0504  3.54  0.0000 
inc2 0.0118  0.0505  0.23  0.8160 
edu_yrs 0.0181  *  0.0031  5.81  0.0000 
icvs_t 0.0232  *  0.0081  2.86  0.0040 
lpop -0.0796  *  0.0110  -7.21  0.0000 
unempl 0.0024  0.0051  0.46  0.6450 
Deap -0.1357  **  0.0536  -2.53  0.0110 
Dla 0.9060  *  0.0904  10.03  0.0000 
_cons 3.5796  *  0.6470  5.53  0.0000 
Number of obs            66922 
Wald test of significance: χ
2  (26)     168328.44 
Prob > χ
2      0.0000  * 
Wald test of exogeneity: χ
2  (3)      38.87 
Prob > χ
2            0.0000 * 
a. ICVS is 1 if asked for a bribe, 0 otherwise. b. See Appendix Table A3 for meaning of the variable names. 
c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Tables 3 and 4 confirm that the qualitative pictures on the determinants of individual and 
business corruption are generally robust to the treatment of endogeneity. The Wald statistic 
rejects the assumption of exogeneity of the country indicators in both cases. Table 3 shows 
that improvements in the regulatory mechanism, advances in human development and 
increases in the literacy levels continue to exert significant downward pressures on individual   22
corruption, though the regulatory effect weakens in statistical significance on the use of IV 
estimation.  Table 4 shows that the size and significance of the effect of the country’s legal 
system in enforcing the rule of law on business corruption is strengthened on the use of IV 
estimation. Moreover, simpler compliance with labour regulation along with greater 
transparency and ease in the issue of operating licenses can be effective policy responses in 
curbing business corruption. These provide further support to the role of legal institutions and 
compliance mechanisms in reducing corruption, especially business corruption. The IV 
results also show that, in contrast, the social indicators, HDI and literacy, are much less 
effective in curbing business corruption than in reducing individual corruption. As with the 
earlier results for the non IV case, after controlling for the respondent’s characteristics and 
the country indicators, while individual corruption shows a significant increase over time, this 
is not so for business corruption. 




c Robust  SE z  P>|z| 
rol -0.6692  *  0.2279  -2.94  0.0030 
hdi 8.8412  5.7742  1.53  0.1260 
literacy -0.0095  0.0432  -0.22  0.8260 
size 0.0560  0.0368  1.52  0.1290 
firmage -0.0018  0.0014  -1.26  0.2090 
edu_topmngr 0.0625  *  0.0149  4.19  0.0000 
female_pc -0.0017  **  0.0008  -2.11  0.0350 
conf_justice -0.0410  *  0.0152  -2.69  0.0070 
DEffGovt -0.1028  0.0628  -1.64  0.1020 
BClegalsyst -0.0053  0.0187  -0.28  0.7770 
BCanticomp 0.0167  0.0188  0.89  0.3730 
BCcrime -0.0078  0.0200  -0.39  0.6950 
BCcorrupt 0.0853  *  0.0207  4.12  0.0000 
BCinstable -0.0382  ***  0.0208  -1.83  0.0670 
BCpolicy 0.0314  0.0227  1.38  0.1670 
BClic 0.0843  *  0.0194  4.34  0.0000 
BClabregu 0.0643  *  0.0197  3.26  0.0010 
income -0.6859  *  0.1574  -4.36  0.0000 
Dexport 0.0098  0.0536  0.18  0.8560 
Dforeign 0.1883  *  0.0733  2.57  0.0100 
wbes_t 0.0312  0.1140  0.27  0.7850 
Deap -0.3011  0.3635  -0.83  0.4080 
Dla -1.1190  *  0.2281  -4.91  0.0000 
lpop -0.0888  **  0.0433  -2.05  0.0400 
unempl -0.0327  ***  0.0182  -1.8  0.0720 
_cons -1.882326  4.156422  -0.45  0.651 
No of Obs        7263 
Wald test of significance: χ
2 (25)        533.4 
Prob > χ
2       0.0000  *
Wald test of exogeneity: χ
2 (3)      22.16 
Prob > χ
2           0.0001 *
a. WBES is 1 if asked for a bribe, 0 otherwise. b. See Appendix Table A3 for meaning of the variable names.    
c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The central message from this discussion is that one needs to differentiate between the two 
forms of corruption in devising effective policy responses relying more on increasing social 
awareness and encouraging social networking in tackling individual corruption, and relying 
more on strengthening regulatory mechanisms and legal institutions and improving   23
transparency in tackling business corruption. The influence of the personal characteristics of 
the respondent, whether it is an individual dealing with a government official or a firm in 
business dealings, on the corruption exposure helps to paint the profile of an individual or a 
firm that is most vulnerable to bribery. 
 
5.  Comparative Evidence on the impact of Individual and Business Corruption on 
Living Standards. 
The recent resurgence of interest in the subject of corruption in the economics literature was 
largely due to the influential paper by Mauro (1995) who using data on corruption and other 
indices prepared by Business International found that corruption lowered economic growth 
by lowering investment. While much of the recent literature has concentrated attention, as we 
have done in this study, on the determinants of corruption, there have been relatively few 
attempts
10 to revisit Mauro’s result and investigate its robustness on the other data sets that 
have become available. This is done in this penultimate section where we attempt to 
investigate on the micro data sets the question of whether corruption has an adverse impact 
on living standards. We do so through the use of two indicators of a nation’s living standards, 
namely, her per capita GNP and her growth rate.
11 The use of the micro data sets, in 
conjunction with a range of country indicators obtained from a variety of data sources, allows 
us to compare the effects of individual and business corruption on living standards .The 
earlier discussion has established some key differences in their determinants. The present 
section extends that discussion to the original issue of the effects of corruption on living 
standards that triggered interest in the subject. 
The results of IV estimation
12 of per capita GNP on a selection of country indicators besides 
the corruption rates calculated from the 2 micro data sets are presented in Table 5. The 
corruption rate variable was treated as potentially endogenous and was instrumented by a 
range of country indicators that were collected from a variety of sources including Wikipedia, 
WDI, HDR, UNDP, World Governance Indicators, 1996-2007, and Djankov, et. al.(2002). 
We used a selection from Ethno linguistic Fractionalization (ELF)
13, Regulatory Burden, 
Unemployment and Literacy as the excluded instruments for corruption rates in the IV 
regressions of GNP, growth rate on the various determinants, including the corruption rates. 
                                                            
10 One such attempt is the study by Mendez and Sepulveda (2006) who found on ICRG data that, in contrast to 
Mauro (1995), “the growth maximising level of corruption is significantly greater than zero”. 
11 While the per capita GNP is calculated at Purchasing Power Parity  to get a better measure of living standards, 
growth is calculated as per the Atlas method as is the standard procedure.   
12 The Stata command ivreg2, constructed by [Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2007)] is used for these 
estimations. 
13 Mendez and Sepulveda (2006), and Shaw, et. al. (2006) have expressed concern over the use of ELF as an 
instrument of the corruption rate since they do not regard ELF as a strong instrument. However, the results 
reported here are robust to the omission of ELF as an instrument.   24
The choice of instruments is always a vexed issue since the ideal instruments are not always 
available and those that are available are not all ideal. The Sargan statistic presented in Table 
5 suggests that the validity of these instruments cannot be rejected at 1 %, thus, providing 
justification to the choice of instruments. Moreover, the Anderson test statistic indicates that, 
generally, the model is identified i.e. the excluded instruments are correlated with the 
endogenous regressor, namely, the corruption rate. Both the data sets agree that high 
corruption does have a negative effect on the country’s per capita GNP, a feature that was 
conveyed by the graphs on the relationship between corruption and GNP presented earlier. 
However, there is some disagreement between the two data sets on the magnitude of this 
effect with individual corruption seen to exert a larger effect on per capita GNP than business 
corruption. 
Table 5: IV Coefficient Estimates




c z  P>|z|  Variableb  Coefficient
c z  P>|z| 
avg icvs -22.4295  **  -2.55 0.0110 avg wbes -1.9358 **  -2.54  0.0110
free 1.3492  1.28  0.2020    free 0.2662    1.16  0.2480 
press  -0.9958 *  -2.57  0.0100   press  -0.0922  -1.19  0.2340 
inflation  0.0186 **  2.2  0.0280   inflation  -0.0100  -0.66  0.5090 
Dla 1.3942  1.64  0.1020    Dla  -0.0881  -0.74  0.4580 
govinter -0.6350  ***  -1.67  0.0940   Deuca  0.9109 *  2.95  0.0030 
dllock  0.8981  1.46  0.1440   hdi  7.5582 *   8.37  0.0000 
controlw  -0.4199  -0.98  0.3280   literacy  0.0166 *  3.01  0.0030 
_cons 10.5115  *  9.83  0.0000    _cons 2.2819  *  2.73  0.0060 
No. of Obs:     49 No. of Obs:    60
Sargan Stats:  χ
2 (1)  1.5580  0.2119   Sargan Stats:  χ
2 (1)  0.2010  0.6539 
Anderson LM stats:  χ
2 (2) ***  5.8630  0.0533   Anderson LM stats:  χ
2 (2) *  10.1320  0.0063 
a. ivreg2 module in Stata 9 is used here. b. See Appendix Table A3 for meaning of the variable names.              
c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Table 6: IV Coefficient Estimates
a: Dependent Variable – Growth Rates 
ICVS WBES 
Variable Coefficient
c zP > |z| Variable Coefficient
c z  P>|z|
avg icvs 0.6026  1.06  0.2900 avg wbes -0.3933 -1.63  0.1030
icvs2  0.3838  0.26  0.7930   wbes2  0.7328 **  2.17  0.0300 
free -0.0088  -0.35  0.7270    free 0.0186  0.47  0.6350 
press 0.0312  1.2  0.2300    press -0.0154  -0.81  0.4160 
inflation -0.0004  -1.49  0.1370    inflation 0.0013  0.61  0.5400 
Dla  -0.0366  -1.53  0.1270   Dla  -0.0640 **  -2.54  0.0110 
rol  0.0593 **  2.14  0.0330   govinter  -0.0160  -1.05  0.2930 
           informal  0.0436 **  2.54  0.0110 
           controlw  -0.0208  -1.08  0.2780 
lgnp95  -0.0357 **  -2.45  0.0140   lgnp02  0.0399 *  2.97  0.0030 
_cons  0.0281  0.18  0.8580   _cons  -0.2744 *  -1.72  0.0850 
No. of Obs:       49 No. of Obs:    47
Sargan Stats:  χ
2 (2)  0.6800  0.8779   Sargan Stats:  χ
2 (1)  1.8020  0.8758 
Anderson LM stats:  χ
2 (3) **  12.3740  0.0148   Anderson LM stats:  χ
2 (2) ***  11.6530 0.0702 
a. ivreg2 module in Stata 9 is used here. b. See Appendix Table A3 for meaning of the variable names.              
c. *, ** and *** imply significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
The results of the IV regressions, with growth rate as the dependent variable, have been 
presented in Table 6. They tell a different story. The celebrated adverse effect of corruption   25
on growth could not be reproduced on these data sets. In fact, there is weak evidence of a 
positive relationship between these variables on both the micro data sets. This is also clear 
from Figure 13 which plots the growth rate against corruption rates for both types of 
corruption, and finds little evidence of a negatively sloped curve
14. The WBES based growth/ 
corruption curve shows that business corruption has a negative impact on growth only 
beyond a very high threshold
15 rate of corruption. Individual corruption, as Table 6 confirms, 
has little or no effect on growth rates. In line with much of the evidence presented earlier, 
Figure 13 indicates sensitivity of the economic growth/ corruption relationship to the data or 
measure used. Ceteris paribus, business corruption leads to lower growth rates than that 
associated with individual corruption, but the situation reverses itself at moderate to high 
levels of corruption. 
Fig 13: Quadratic Fit between a country’s Corruption Rate/Score and Growth Rate 
 
 
6.  Summary and Conclusions. 
As the literature on corruption has grown over the past few years, so have the data sets 
containing information on corrupt practices by individuals and firms. Mauro (1995)’s results 
on corruption having a negative impact on growth by lowering investment, along with 
evidence on the adverse welfare and distributional consequences of increasing corruption, led 
to a revival of interest in a subject that has been around for a very long time. The recent 
empirical literature on corruption can be subdivided into two streams: one studies the 
determinants of corruption and the other its consequences. With increasing concern over the 
micro and macro economic consequences of widespread corruption in a society, it became 
                                                            
14 The WBES summary statistics that have been presented in Appendix, Table A2, show that the high growth 
countries such as Bangladesh, India and China also record high corruption rates. 
15 Closer inspection showed, however, that the backward bend in the WBES based curve is due to a single 
country observation, an obvious outlier, and does not therefore constitute evidence of a negative association 
between corruption and growth rates.   26
necessary for policy purposes to profile an individual or firm that is particularly vulnerable to 
corruption and this provided the incentive for a rapidly expanding literature on the key 
variables that contribute to corrupt practices. Apart from an increased understanding of this 
phenomenon, the expanding empirical literature on corruption has also led to the availability 
of new and qualitatively superior data sets on corruption.  
Much of the earlier empirical work on corruption that followed Mauro’s study, including his 
own investigation, was conducted on the corruption perceptions data made available by the 
Transparency International and Business International. In recent years, there has been 
increasing concern over the use of perceptions based measures that introduce subjective and 
cultural biases in the information. Moreover, the country level information does not allow an 
investigation of the role of micro variables such as the individual or firm characteristics in 
explaining corrupt behaviour. This sets a serious constraint on the policy usefulness of the 
results. Consequently, there has been a move in recent years to the increasing use of micro 
data sets that contain responses to questions on a host of topics including corruption and the 
personal attributes of the respondent. Another related development has been the combination 
of information from the micro data sets with macro information obtained from country level 
indicators in the investigation of the causes and consequences of corruption. The present 
study follows this approach. 
The increased availability of data sets on corruption along with the varied nature of that 
information sets up the chief motivation of this study, namely, a systematic comparison of the 
evidence on the causes and consequences of corruption provided by these alternative data 
sets. To our knowledge, such a comprehensive comparison has not been attempted in the 
literature to date. Since the data sets often capture different aspects of corruption, the 
comparison is not just about different ways of measuring corruption but also about different 
types of corruption. 
  The three data sets that we have considered in this comparative study, namely, the 
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transparency International and the micro data sets 
from the ICVS and the WBES, which targeted individuals and firms, respectively, allowed us 
to examine (a) the sensitivity of the picture on corruption to the use of subjective versus 
objective measures, and (b) differences in the magnitude, cause and consequences of 
individual and business corruption. While (a) is performed by comparing the evidence on the 
perception of corruption by business people with micro based information on the actual 
experiences of individuals and firms, (b) is done by comparing the evidence from the ICVS 
and the WBES data sets. A comparison between the CPI and the WBES measures throws 
light on the issue of perception versus reality since both these data sets are based on the 
responses of business people. Since the ICVS contains information on the individual’s 
response to bribe demands from public officials and the WBES contains information on 
corresponding responses from firms in their business dealings, a comparison of the evidence 
on these micro data sets can be interpreted as one between individual and business 
corruption.   27
The results show several significant differences and similarities between the results from the 
different data sets. Not surprisingly, the cross country picture on corruption from the 
Corruption Perceptions Index is closer to that from the WBES, since both are based on the 
responses of business people. Both these data sets paint a bleaker picture on corruption than 
is portrayed by the ICVS data set. Moreover, the shape of the relationship between corruption 
and living standards as measured by per capita GNP at PPP differs between the three data 
sets. This is also true of the picture on the temporal movement in the corruption rates as 
portrayed by the alternative data sets. For countries which figure in both the micro data sets, 
individual corruption is seen to be less severe than business corruption. As a country 
develops from low levels of per capita income, the individual corruption rates initially decline 
rapidly and fall to low levels for middle income countries and then remain static. As the 
country develops further, the business corruption rates then start to decline. Throughout the 
development process, business corruption rates exceed the individual corruption rates with 
the gap between the two corruption rates starting to close only at high per capita GNP levels. 
Alternatively, the mix of corruption between individual and business corruption shifts in 
favour of the latter as the country develops. Another significant difference between the ICVS 
and WBES data sets is that, while institutions such as the regulatory mechanism and the legal 
system are more effective in controlling business corruption, the role of the human 
development indicators such as literacy is of greater importance in controlling individual 
corruption. A common feature of these results is that they underline the importance of 
strengthening trust, developing social network, greater transparency and reduced uncertainty 
in devising policies to curb corruption. Another interesting result from our comparison 
exercise is that, for countries at low levels of development, perception of corruption by the 
business people tends to be worse than the actual experience of firms operating in the country 
concerned, but the situation is reversed for the high income countries. This can be interpreted 
as evidence of the cultural bias in the corruption perception index used in the earlier studies 
whereby non resident business people contributing to the CPI scores, and who typically 
resided in the developed countries, tended to take a more pessimistic view of the corruption 
scene in the low income, developing countries, where they did not reside, than is justified by 
reality. It is therefore not surprising that as we move to the middle income countries, i.e. 
closer to the residence of the corruption evaluators, the perception scores show a significant 
improvement in corruption and, for the more affluent countries, the perception of corruption 
actually becomes better than the reality of corruption based on the WBES measure.  
Two points of agreement between the three indicators are: (a) as a country becomes more 
affluent, its corruption rate declines, and (b) there is no evidence of a negative relationship 
between growth rate and corruption rate. This suggests that while the evidence confirms that 
high corruption rates do characterise low income countries and may even be the cause of their 
low income levels, there is no evidence to support the proposition that corruption constrains 
growth. The absence of any negative association between growth and corruption rates, which 
is consistent with recent evidence from other studies but not with Mauro (1995)’s influential 
findings, is robust to the treatment of endogeneity of the corruption rate variable and to the 
choice of instruments. This result should, however, be treated with care. Growth rates are 
subject to large measurement errors. Moreover, in case of many of the poorer countries with a   28
sizeable informal economy and where most of the corruption prevails, the growth and 
corruption rates are unlikely to be true measures. The overall message of this study is the 
need to develop a differentiated policy in tackling the various forms of corruption.  
The present study calls for further comparisons of the evidence on corruption and its different 
forms between the various data sets.  With recent attempts to conduct studies on data from 
specially designed experiments for eliciting attitudes to corruption, a logical extension of the 
present study will be to compare the key differences between the use of experimental data 
and the more conventional data sets. The establishment of robustness in the qualitative results 
is essential before effective policies can be formulated in an area of considerable policy 
concern.      
 
References. 
Bardhan, P. (1997), “Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues”, Journal of 
Economic Literature, 35, 1320-1346. 
Baum, C.F., Schaffer, M.E., Stillman, S. 2007.  “Ivreg2: Stata module for extended 
instrumental variables/2SLS, GMM and AC/HAC, LIML and k-class regression”,   
http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s425401.html 
Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkel, N. and Gangadharan, L. (2007), “Propensities to Engage 
in and Punish Corrupt Behaviour: Experimental Evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia, 
and Singapore”, forthcoming, Journal of Public Economics. 
Dabla-Norris, E., Gradstein, M., and Inchauste, G. (2008), “What causes firms to hide 
output? The determinants of informality”, Journal of Development Economics, 85, 1-27. 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A. (2002), “The regulation of 
entry”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 1-37. 
Fisman, R. And Gatti, R. (2002), “Decentralization and corruption: evidence across 
countries”, Journal of Public Economics, 83, 325-345. 
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H. and Alonso-Terme, R. (2002), “Does Corruption affect income 
inequality and poverty?”, Economics of Governance, 3, 23-45. 
Hunt, J. (2004), “Trust and Bribery: The Role of Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime”, 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working paper no. 10510. 
Jain, A. (2001), “Corruption: A Review”, Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1), 71-121. 
Knack,S. and Zak,P.J. (2003), “Building Trust: Public Policy, Interpersonal Trust and 
Economic Development”, Supreme Court Economic Review, 10, 91-107.   29
Lambdsdorff, J.G. (2006), “Measuring Corruption-The Validity and Precision of Subjective 
Indicators”, Ch.5 in Measuring Corruption, edited by Sampsford,C., Shacklock,A., 
Connors,C. and Galtung.F., Ashgate. 
Li, H., Xu, X.C., and Zou, H. (2000), “Corruption, Income Distribution, and Growth”, 
Economics and Politics, 12 (2), 155-182. 
Mauro, P. (1995), “Corruption and Growth”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 681-712. 
Mendez, F. And Sepulveda, F. (2006), “Corruption, growth and political regimes: Cross 
country evidence”, European Journal of Political Economy, 22, 82-98. 
Mishra, A. (2005), (ed.) The Economics of Corruption, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 
Mocan, N. (2008), “What determines Corruption? International Evidence from Corruption 
Data”, Economic Inquiry, 46(4), 493-510. 
Montinola, G. and Jackman, R.W. (2002), “Sources of Corruption: A Cross-Country Study”, 
British Journal of Political Science, 32, 147-170. 
Olken, B.A. (2007), “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in 
Indonesia”, Journal of Political Economy, 15(2), 200-249. 
Olken, B.A. (2008), “Corruption Perceptions vs. Corruption Reality”, NBER Working paper 
No. 12428, Sept. 12, 2008. 
Paldam, M. (2002), “The cross-country pattern of corruption: economics, culture and the 
seesaw dynamics”, European Journal of Political Economy, 18, 215-240. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1999), “Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences and 
Reform”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Sampsford, C., Shacklock, A., Connors, C. And Galtung, F. (2006) (eds.), Measuring 
Corruption,  Ashgate , Hampshire, U.K. 
Shaw, P., Katsaiti, M., and Jurgilas, M. (2006), “Corruption and Growth Under Weak 
Identification”, Department of Economics Working Paper Series, University of Connecticut, 
U.S.A. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1993), “Corruption”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108(3), 
599-617. 
Svensson, J. (2003), “Who must pay bribes and how much: evidence from a cross section of 
firms”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), 207-230. 
Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y. and Azfar, O. (2001), “Gender and corruption”, Journal of 
Development Economics, 64, 25-55. 
Treisman, D. (2000), “The causes of corruption: a cross-national study”, Journal of Public 
Economics, 76, 399-457.   30
You, J. And Khagram, S. (2005), “A Comparative Study of Inequality and Corruption”, 
American Sociological Review, 70, 136- 157. 
World Bank (1997), The State in a Changing World, World Development Report, Oxford 
University Press, New York. 
   31
Appendix. 
TABLE A1: Average Corruption rates by Country from ICVS data 





Albania 1995  1200  0.128227  0.1334762  0.1226157 
Albania 1999  1498  0.5907877  0.6022099  0.5801033 
Argentina 1995  1000  0.2902198  0.3805029  0.2189946 
Argentina 2000  8931  0.0480291  0.0777055  0.0220482 
Austria 1995  1507  0.007209  0.0140337  0.0020047 
Australia 1999  2005  0.0032528  0.0046452  0.0020482 
Azarbaijan 1999  930  0.2080645  0.24748  0.1694876 
Belgium 1999  2501  0.003497  0.0052555  0.0020359 
Bulgaria 1996  1076  0.1913465  0.2562265  0.1385016 
Bulgaria 1999  1505  0.1637465  0.20124  0.1330906 
Bolivia 1995  999  0.2586832  0.3256653  0.2048799 
Brazil 1995  1000  0.1785698  0.2899866  0.0748962 
Botswana 1996  644  0.0289855  0.066513  0.0045445 
Botswana 1999  1197  0.0083542  0.0054348  0.011041 
Belarus 1996  999  0.1201213  0.1820983  0.0802182 
Belarus 1999  1520  0.2057851  0.2797962  0.1593499 
Canada 1995  2134  0.0039428  0.00425  0.003653 
Canada 1999  2078  0.0039187  0.0068467  0.000928 
Cambodia 2000  3155  0.2175843  0.2304108  0.2174378 
Switzerland 1995  1000  0.002337  0.0042446  0.0006989 
Colombia 1996  1000  0.1924827  0.2287588  0.1545746 
Colombia 1999  1016  0.1722441  0.2047244  0.1397638 
Costa Rica  1995  1000  0.0994962  0.1465004  0.0546953 
Czech Republic  1995  1801  0.0786295 0.1069879  0.0541168 
Czech Republic  1999  1500  0.0572155 0.0868463  0.0302989 
Denmark 1999  3007  0.0027892  0.0055363  0.0003409 
Estonia 1994  1173  0.0384317  0.0538509  0.0236055 
Estonia 1999  1700  0.0517459  0.075554  0.028979 
Finland 1995  3830  0.00129  0.0028008  0   32
TABLE A1:  CONTINUED 
Finland 1999  1782  0.0015798  0.003221  0 
France 1995  1003  0.0070369  0.012358  0.0017475 
France 1999  1000  0.012515  0.0169618  0.0089495 
Georgia 1995  1137  0.2185932  0.2937793  0.1630657 
Georgia 1999  1000  0.168  0.2346491  0.1121324 
Great Britain  1995  5407  0.0025006  0.0030808  0.0019924 
Great Britain  1999  5513  0.0006904  0.0009836  0.0004574 
Croatia 1996  994  0.1603995  0.2043567  0.1237415 
Croatia 1999  1532  0.094961  0.1670751  0.0482806 
Hungary 1995  756  0.0387121  0.0569821  0.0252434 
Hungary 1999  1513  0.0982331  0.1535499  0.0647025 
Indonesia 1995  1400  0.2988933  0.3178846  0.2747227 
India 1995  1200  0.2104783  0.2531873  0.1688932 
Japan 1999  2211  0.0004218  0  0.0008195 
Korea (Republic of)  1999  2043  0.0337739  0.0525794  0.0154589 
Kyrgyzigstan 1995  1750  0.2039211  0.2965001  0.1357727 
Lesotho 1999  1010  0.1920792  0.2429907  0.1683599 
Lithuania 1996  1176  0.1100574  0.1578499  0.0663126 
Lithuania 1999  1526  0.2285781  0.3036536  0.1811239 
Latvia 1995  1411  0.1352757  0.1905158  0.0990324 
Latvia 1999  1201  0.1456806  0.1835272  0.1178425 
Mongolia 1995  1200  0.0462369  0.0561117  0.036654 
Mongolia 1999  944  0.2136447  0.2495402  0.1782027 
Macedonia 1995  700  0.0772936  0.1025669  0.0523075 
Mozambique 2001  993  0.305136  0.3636364  0.246988 
Malta 1996  1000  0.0403518  0.0400238  0.0407883 
Namibia 1999  1061  0.0546654  0.0882353  0.0267857 
Nigeria 1997  1012  0.298419  0.32358  0.2645012 
Netherlands 1995  2008  0.0054577  0.0086853  0.0026843 
Netherlands 1999  2000  0.0040385  0.0039475  0.0041151 
Panama 1999  902  0.1053215  0.1535181  0.0531178   33
TABLE A1:  CONTINUED 
Philippines 1995  1500  0.0436209  0.0703615  0.031719 
Philippines 1999  1500  0.036  0.0717822  0.0228102 
Poland 1991  2033  0.0531637  0.0730063  0.036013 
Poland 1995  3483  0.0474604  0.0714246  0.028555 
Poland 1999  6337  0.0424111  0.0621918  0.0267921 
Portugal 1999  2000  0.013514  0.0247729  0.0073308 
Paraguay 1995  587  0.1382671  0.201096  0.1019548 
Romania 1995  1091  0.1139695  0.1656879  0.0728839 
Romania 1999  1506  0.1919286  0.2014516  0.1837676 
Sweden 1995  1000  0.002474  0.0021202  0.0027828 
Sweden 1999  2001  0.000909  0  0.001716 
Slovenia 1996  2053  0.0123391  0.0173403  0.0081811 
Slovenia 2000  3885  0.0209208  0.0237722  0.0185419 
Slovakia 1996  1105  0.1393661  0.1991179  0.0888913 
Russia 1995  1018  0.1873054  0.2651906  0.1233532 
Russia 1999  1500  0.1659668  0.2755719  0.1064282 
Swaziland 1999  1006  0.1729622  0.2089552  0.1415094 
Ukraine 1996  1000  0.1261116  0.1776644  0.0921705 
Ukraine 1999  1509  0.1622425  0.236506  0.1140321 
Uganda 1995  1197  0.2358992  0.3093645  0.1700016 
Uganda 1999  998  0.3466934  0.4178499  0.2772277 
United States  1995  1003  0.002655  0.006511  0 
United States  1999  1000  0.002063  0.0050195  0 
South Africa  1995  1006  0.0755096  0.1354769  0.0273637 
South Africa  1999  1336  0.0291916  0.0426229  0.0183357 
Zambia 1999  1047  0.0983763  0.097035  0.1119691 
Zimbabwe 1995  1006  0.0718364  0.1170137  0.0418924 
Catalonia 1999  2909  0.0024719  0.0017366  0.0029751 
Yugoslavia 1995  1094  0.1742663  0.223691  0.1233744 
 Source: International Crime Victims Surveys, by United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 1988-2001. (Authors’ 
calculations) 
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TABLE A2: Average Corruption rates by Country from WBES data 







Albania 2002  170  0.929412  0.918605  0.962963  0.9 
Albania 2005  204  0.862745  0.865979  0.8888889  0.7692308 
Armenia 2002  171  0.48538  0.523256  0.3541667  0.5675676 
Armenia 2005  351  0.680912  0.677249  0.7542373  0.5 
Angola 2006  850  0.321177  0.316327  0.3221476  0.5333334 
Argentina 2006  2126  0.459078  0.444304  0.469697  0.4599628 
Azarbaijan 2002  170  0.558824  0.658824  0.5348837  0.3902439 
Azarbaijan 2005  350  0.725714  0.78  0.7251908  0.6086956 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  2002  182  0.752747  0.683673  0.7941176  0.8571429 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  2005  200  0.715  0.656566  0.6666667  0.9090909 
Bangladesh 2002  1001  0.874126  0.776316  0.9038461  0.8707692 
Burkina Faso  2006  278  0.460432  0.445  0.4754098  0.5625 
Bulgaria 2002  250  0.744  0.736  0.880597  0.6034483 
Bulgaria 2004  548  1  1  1  1 
Bulgaria 2005  300  0.61  0.596591  0.6428571  0.6111111 
Benin 2004  197  0.989848  0.985612  1  1 
Bolivia 2006  1226  0.461664  0.422304  0.4875  0.5052083 
Brazil 2003  1642  0.896468  0.898305  0.8905192  0.9076923 
Burundi 2006  540  0.262963  0.244186  0.2967033  0.5263158 
Botswana 2006  684  0.312866  0.304038  0.3181818  0.3448276 
Belarus 2002  250  0.628  0.672727  0.6744186  0.462963 
Belarus 2005  325  0.412308  0.467949  0.3944954  0.3 
Belarus 2008  273  0.589744  0.561798  0.6701031  0.5176471 
Cambodia 2003  503  0.954274  0.962428  0.9382716  0.9342105 
Congo DR  2006  680  0.247059  0.229703  0.2980132  0.2608696 
Chile 2004  948  0.298523  0.287926  0.3079179  0.2992958 
Chile 2006  2034  0.322026  0.290375  0.328  0.3513011 
Cameroon 2006  344  0.43314  0.428571  0.4528302  0.4 
China 2002  1548  0.76615  0.712418  0.7357798  0.7952941 
China 2003  2400  1  1  1  1 
Colombia 2006  2000  0.428  0.408955  0.4464993  0.4495798 
Costa Rica  2005  343  0.501458  0.509174  0.4705882  0.525   35
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Cape Verde  2006  196  0.19898  0.217391  0.1454545  0.3333333 
Czech Republic  2002  268  0.574627 0.563758  0.6296296  0.5538462 
Czech Republic  2005  343  0.752187 0.763636  0.75  0.7142857 
Germany 2005  1196  0.260034  0.207037  0.3993399  0.2402597 
Dominican Republic  2005  225  0.871111  0.827068  0.9322034  0.9375 
Algeria 2002  557  0.770198  0.788462  0.7836539  0.6619718 
Ecuador 2003  453  0.644592  0.657534  0.635514  0.6419753 
Ecuador 2006  1316  0.550912  0.520295  0.5769231  0.5582329 
Estonia 2002  170  0.482353  0.483517  0.4791667  0.483871 
Estonia 2005  219  0.447489  0.415254  0.5151515  0.4285714 
Egypt 2004  977  0.735926  0.725119  0.7356948  0.7606383 
Eritrea 2002  79  0.164557  0.15  0.1538462  0.2 
Spain 2005  606  0.214522  0.201635  0.2635659  0.2 
Ethiopia 2002  427  0.606557  0.596899  0.7594936  0.494382 
Guinea 2006  446  0.408072  0.40665  0.3846154  0.5 
Georgia 2002  174  0.862069  0.826531  0.9047619  0.9117647 
Georgia 2005  200  0.645  0.673077  0.6315789  0.5897436 
Georgia 2008  373  0.44504  0.453488  0.4814815  0.3278688 
Ghana 2007  494  0.34413  0.324022  0.3627451  0.5 
Gambia 2006  348  0.175287  0.149573  0.2061856  0.3529412 
Guinea-Bissau 2006  159  0.836478  0.819549  0.9545454  0.75 
Greece 2005  546  0.419414  0.414392 0.4634146  0.3934426 
Guatemala 2003  455  0.923077  0.925373  0.9419355  0.8888889 
Guatemala 2006  1044  0.450192  0.441975  0.4339152  0.4915966 
Guyana 2004  163  0.361963  0.252874  0.4363636  0.6153846 
Honduras 2003  450  0.802222  0.821739  0.7946429  0.7685185 
Honduras 2006  872  0.511468  0.501272  0.5036765  0.5410628 
Croatia 2002  187  0.647059  0.669811  0.6136364  0.6388889 
Croatia 2005  236  0.614407  0.633333  0.6557377  0.5272727 
Hungary 2002  250  0.476  0.414634  0.5217391  0.5614035 
Hungary 2005  610  0.429508  0.432927  0.4315789  0.4130435 
Indonesia 2003  713  0.706872  0.5  0.6204819  0.787062 
Ireland 2005  501  0.179641  0.191223  0.1481481  0.1756757 
India 2002  1827  0.789272  0.768603  0.8150183  0.8152611   36
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India 2005  4234  0.600614  0.911765  0.7948718  0.6923077 
Jamaica 2005  94  0.819149  0.05  0.0858586  0.056 
Jordan 2006  503  0.065606  0.936709  0.9038461  0.9473684 
Kenya 2003  284  0.922535  0.402667  0.2941177  0.4807692 
South Korea  2005  598  0.394649  0.657895  0.7457627  0.7894737 
Kyrgyzigstan 2002  173  0.716763  0.764706  0.8292683  0.8888889 
Kyrgyzigstan 2003  102  0.823529  0.728395  0.7794118  0.7924528 
Kyrgyzigstan 2005  202  0.762376  0.494737  0.55  0.6363636 
Kazakhstan 2002  250  0.548  0.545455  0.573604  0.5575221 
Kazakhstan 2005  585  0.557265  0.915385  0.8975903  0.9824561 
Lebanon 2006  354  0.918079  0.33913  0.5466667  0.5925926 
Lao PDR  2006  246  0.45935  0.555556  0.6923077  0.5666667 
Lesotho 2003  75  0.626667  0.583333  0.6229508  0.6976744 
Lithuania 2002  200  0.62  0.546875  0.6030535  0.7209302 
Lithuania 2004  239  0.610879  0.660194  0.7192982  0.6444445 
Lithuania 2005  205  0.673171  0.5  0.7027027  0.6285715 
Latvia 2002  176  0.568182  0.403101  0.5789474  0.4736842 
Latvia 2005  205  0.448781  0.321918  0.4146982  0.5263158 
Morocco 2004  850  0.441177  0.761905  0.8  0.7592593 
Mauritius 2005  212  0.783019  0.831325 0.754717  0.8421053 
Moldova 2002  174  0.810345  0.921053  0.8787879  0.96875 
Moldova 2003  103  0.92233  0.607362  0.7272727  0.7922078 
Moldova 2005  350  0.685714  0.841584  0.8956522  0.8571429 
Madagascar 2005  293  0.866894  0.685714  0.796875  0.7307692 
Mongolia 2004  195  0.728205  0.851852  0.8823529  0.7241379 
Montenegro 2003  100  0.82  0.728155  0.59375  0.6176471 
Macedonia 2002  170  0.676471  0.788618  0.7045454  0.7575758 
Macedonia 2005  200  0.765  0.774194  0.9347826  0.7857143 
Mali 2003  155  0.825806  0.268698  0.4040404  0.6428571 
Mauritania 2006  474  0.308017  0.575758  0.5503356  0.6363636 
Mozambique 2007  479  0.572025  0.4  0.7546012  0.8739496 
Malawi 2005  320  0.75625  0.45411  0.4938957  0.4958124 
Mexico 2006  2960  0.474662  0.525346  0.5300261  0.5714286 
Malaysia 2002  902  0.543237  0.288591  0.3657143  0.25   37
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Namibia 2006  658  0.306991  0.412903  0.3875  0.6666667 
Niger 2005  250  0.42  0.83737  0.8828125  0.7428572 
Nicaragua 2003  452  0.84292  0.438433  0.4702194  0.51 
Nicaragua 2006  956  0.456067  0.287671  0.3352273  0.3076923 
Oman 2003  337  0.317507  0.365964  0.4322917  0.4140127 
Panama 2006  1208  0.394868  0.891304  0.8571429  1 
Peru 2002  576  0.875  0.42616  0.4785847  0.4743083 
Peru 2006  1264  0.45807  0.444444  0.6602871  0.7011952 
Philippines 2003  716  0.610335  0.635328  0.7614314  0.7117117 
Pakistan 2002  965  0.709845  0.775735  0.7272727  0.7641509 
Poland 2002  500  0.762  0.647059  0.7941176  0.9130435 
Poland 2003  108  0.75  0.662732  0.6975806  0.6119403 
Poland 2005  975  0.664615  0.654971  0.6891892  0.5280899 
Portugal 2005  505  0.637624  0.497504  0.5489796  0.5365854 
Paraguay 2006  1226  0.523654  0.796296  0.75  0.8591549 
Romania 2002  255  0.8  0.833333  0.7932692  0.7761194 
Romania 2005  600  0.806667  0.103571  0.2523364  0.2162162 
Rwanda 2006  424  0.150943  0.45  0.4722222  0.4375 
Slovenia 2002  188  0.452128  0.401515  0.4042553  0.3636364 
Slovenia 2005  223  0.394619  0.792683  0.75  0.6153846 
Slovakia 2002  170  0.741177  0.508197  0.4716981  0.3777778 
Slovakia 2005  220  0.472727  0.622807  0.8217822  0.8043478 
Senegal 2003  262  0.732824  0.395408  0.4  0.4583333 
Senegal 2007  506  0.39921  0.618644  0.6470588  0.5443038 
Serbia 2002  250  0.596  0.706422  0.6216216  0.6225166 
Serbia 2003  408  0.644608  0.709091  0.8245614  0.7051282 
Serbia 2005  300  0.73  0.266667  0.3642384  0.5789474 
Sri Lanka  2004  452  0.480089  0.539823  0.6503068  0.6034483 
Russia 2002  506  0.590909  0.632727  0.6497175  0.6912752 
Russia 2005  601  0.652246  0.611399  0.72  0.628866 
El Salvador  2003  465  0.655914  0.415879  0.4678363  0.4156977 
El Salvador  2006  1386  0.435065  0.301435  0.4049587  0.36 
Swaziland 2006  614  0.32899  0.711191  0.8347458  0.8666667 
Syria 2003  560  0.775  0.419355  0.5134615  0.5031133   38
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Tailand 2004  1385  0.503249  0.868852  0.6268657  0.6170213 
Tajikistan 2002  176  0.710227  0.847059  0.9375  0.6666667 
Tajikistan 2003  107  0.850467  0.432836  0.6086956  0.4146341 
Tajikistan 2005  200  0.51  0.476471  0.4615385  0.6363636 
Tajikistan 2008  360  0.494444  0.637097  0.6387097  0.5135135 
Turkey 2002  514  0.610895  0.56875  0.5436242  0.4545455 
Turkey 2004  557  0.543986  0.819315  0.8202479  0.808554 
Turkey 2005  1323  0.813303  0.71137  0.7191781  0.637931 
Turkey 2008  1152  0.69184  0.769912  0.8823529  0.8301887 
Tanzania 2003  276  0.818841  0.226263  0.3536585  0.4639175 
Tanzania 2006  838  0.29117  0.748837  0.7142857  0.6388889 
Ukraine 2002  463  0.712743  0.56129  0.729885  0.6909091 
Ukraine 2005  594  0.63468  0.795107  0.8184819  0.8364486 
Ukraine 2008  851  0.810811  0.66879  0.7525773  0.9565217 
Uganda 2003  300  0.74  0.264256  0.3445122  0.3797468 
Uganda 2006  1126  0.295737  0.342561  0.3622881  0.3582888 
Uruguay 2006  1242  0.352657  0.522727  0.4347826  0.3559322 
Uzbekistan 2002  260  0.461539  0.285714  0.3513514  0.2857143 
Uzbekistan 2003  100  0.31  0.509091  0.4736842  0.5084746 
Uzbekistan 2005  300  0.5  0.383459  0.5185185  0.5408163 
Uzbekistan 2008  366  0.47541  0.450704  0.459144  0.3653846 
Venezuela 2006  1000  0.444  0.55  0.6357466  0.6002747 
Viet Nam  2005  1650  0.595152  0.327586  0.5555556  0.5454546 
South Africa  2003  603  0.525705  0.782609  0.6969697  0.7631579 
Zambia 2002  207  0.7343  0.043651  0.032  0.0416667 
West Bank and Gaza  2006  401  0.0399  .  .  . 
Source: World Bank Enterprise Survey, 2002-2008. (Authors’ calculations)   39
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ICVS  Individual characteristics (A)  Definition (Source)  
icvs_binary  Bribe  Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is asked for bribe, 0 otherwise 
smalltown Small  city    Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is living in a town with a 
population of 50,000 or less 
medtown Middle-size  city    Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is living in a town with a 
population of 50,000 to 1 million 
male  Male   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is male, 0 otherwise  
age1  Age  
  
16–34  Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 16 and 34, 0 
otherwise  
age2 35–59  Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is between ages 35 and 59, 0 
otherwise  
age3  60+  Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is older than 60 yr, 0 otherwise 
single  Marital Status 
 
Single   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is single, 0 otherwise  
married  Married   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is married, 0 otherwise  
widow  Widowed   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is widowed, 0 otherwise  
livtog Living  together    Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is living together as a couple 
(but not married), 0 otherwise  
divorced  Divorced   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is divorced, 0 otherwise  
working  Occupation 
Status 
Working   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is working, 0 otherwise  
lookwork  Looking for job   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is looking for job, 0 otherwise  
keephome  Home keeper   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is house keeper, 0 otherwise  
retired Retired/disabled  Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is retired or disabled, 0 
otherwise  
atschool  Student   Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is still at school, 0 otherwise  
otherwork Other    Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is in other occupational 
position, 0 otherwise  
inc1  Income  Upper income   Dummy variable (=1) if the family income is in the upper 50% of the 
country, 0 otherwise  
inc2 Lower  income    Dummy variable (=1) if the family income is in the lower 50% of the 
country, 0 otherwise  
icvs_t  Year of Survey  Takes the value 0 in base year 1988 and maximum value is 13 in 2001 
edu_yrs  Education   Years of education of the respondent    40
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WBES  Firm characteristics  (G)  Definition (Source)  
wbes_binary Bribe 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent is asked for bribe, 0 otherwise 
(G)  
size  Firm size dummies 
A firm is defined as small if it has between 5 and 50 employees, 
medium size if it has between 51 and 500 employees and large if it has 
more than 500 employees. 
firmage  Age of Firm  Age of Firm at the survey year 
edu_topmngr  Education of the Top Manager  Highest level of education of the top manager 
female_pc  Percentage of Female workers  Percentage workers female in total workforce  
conf_justice Confidence in Judicial System 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "tend to agree", 
"mostly agree", or "fully agree" to the question: Confident judicial 
system will uphold property rights?, 0 otherwise  
DEffGovt 
Efficiency of government in 
delivering services 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "somewhat efficient", 
"efficient" or "very efficient" to the question: How would you generally 
rate the efficiency of central and local government in delivering 
services, 0 otherwise  
BClegalsyst 
Business constraint: legal 
system/conflict resolution 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", 
"major" or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is 
functioning of the judiciary for the operation and growth of your 
business, 0 otherwise  
BCanticomp 
Business constraint:  anti-
competitive/informal practices 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", 
"major" or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is anti-
competitive/informal practices for the operation and growth of your 
business, 0 otherwise  
BCcrime 
Business constraint: crime, theft, 
disorder 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", 
"major" or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is crime, 
theft, disorder for the operation and growth of your business, 0 
otherwise  
BCcorrupt Business  constraint:  corruption 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", 
"major" or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is 
corruption for the operation and growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
BCinstable 
Business constraint: 
macroeconomic instability  (infl., 
exch. rate) 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", 
"major" or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is 
macroeconomic instability for the operation and growth of your 
business, 0 otherwise  
BCpolicy 
Business constraint: economic & 
regulatory policy uncertainty 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", 
"major" or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is economic 
& regulatory policy uncertainty for the operation and growth of your 
business, 0 otherwise  
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BClic 
Business constraint: licensing  and 
operating permits 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", 
"major" or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is licensing  
and operating permits for the operation and growth of your business, 0 
otherwise  
BClabregu 
Business constraint: labour 
regulations 
Dummy variable (=1) if the respondent answers "minor", "moderate", 
"major" or "very severe" to the question: How problematic is labour 
regulations for the operation and growth of your business, 0 otherwise  
income  Income grouping for survey year 
Firm Income = 1 if "low"; =2 if "lower-middle"; = 3 if "upper-middle" 
= 4 if "high"; = 5 if "high oecd" 
Dexport  Exporter  Dummy variable (=1) if the firm is an exporter, 0 otherwise  
Dforeign   Foreign  Dummy variable (=1) if the firm is of foreign ownership, 0 otherwise  
wbes_t  Year of Survey  Takes the value 0 in base year 2002 and maximum value is 4 in 2006  
Country Code  Country characteristics   Definition (Source)  
avg_icvs  Average ICVS  Weighted (household) Average of the binary ICVS variable (A) 
avg_wbes  Average WBES  Average of the binary WBES variable (G) 
icvs2  Square of Average ICVS  Square of Average ICVS (A) 
wbes2  Square of Average WBES  Square of Average WBES (G) 
Deap  East Asia and Pacific  
Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in East Asia and Pacific, 0 
otherwise  
Dla  Latin America and Caribbean 
Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in Latin America and Caribbean, 
0 otherwise  
DSA  South Africa   Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in South Africa, 0 otherwise  
DSSAf  Sub Saharan Africa 
Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in Sub Saharan Africa, 0 
otherwise  
DNAm 
United States, Canada, and 
Bermuda  
Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in the United States, Canada, or 
Bermuda, 0 otherwise  
DMENAf Middle  East and North Africa 
Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in the Middle East and North 
Africa, 0 otherwise  
DEuCA  Europe and Central Asia 
Dummy variable (=1) if the country is in the Europe and Central Asia, 
0 otherwise  
dllock Landlocked   
Dummy variable (=1) if the country is landlocked (surrounded by land), 
0 otherwise (B)  
lpop  Log Population   Log of Population of the country in millions in the survey year (C)  
literacy Literacy  rate 
Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above) in the country 
in the survey year (C)  
unempl Unemployment  rate    Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (C)   42
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reg_burden Regulatory  Burden 
Cost and time involved in carrying out the procedures a start-up 
entrepreneur has to comply with in order to obtain a legal status, as a 
share of 1999 per capita GDP (E) 
rol  Rule of law  Synthetic index, rescaled adding 4 points to the index to avoid negative 
values where a higher indicator denotes a higher quality rule of law (F)
hdi  Human Development Index  Human Development Indicator from UNDP, where higher values 
denote higher development (D) 
lgnp  Log Gross National Income  Log of GNI per capita, PPP (current international $) (C) 
free Economic  Freedom 
Heritage Index of : -1) limitations to trade, 2) fiscal burden, 3) 
government intervention, 4) monetary policy, 5) limitation to foreign 
investment, 6) limitations to banking, 7) Control of wages and prices, 
8) limitations to property rights, 9) regulation, 10) international market 
(www.heritage.org) (H) 
press  Freedom of Press 
Index of restrictions on media content 1) laws and regulations (0-15 
points, 2) political pressures and controls (0-15 points), 3 repressive 
actions (e.g. killing journalists, censorship) (0-5 points). More point 
means less freedom. Rated: 1 (free)  to 3 (unfree) (Freedom House: 
Press Freedom Survey) (H) 
inflation Inflation  Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) (C) 
govinter Government  Intervention 
Index of: a) government consumption in % of economy, b) government 
ownership of business, c) share of government revenues from state-
owned enterprises and property, d) economic output produced by 
government. Rated: 1 (free) to 5 (unfree) (www.heritage.org) (H) 
controlw 
Government Control of Wages 
and Prices 
 Index of: a) minimum wage laws, b) freedom to set prices, c) 
government price controls, d) extend to which government price 
controls are used, e) government subsidies to businesses that affect 
prices. Rated: 1 (free) to 5 (unfree) (www.heritage.org) (H) 
informal Informal Sector 
Index of: a) smuggling, b) piracy of intellectual property in the informal 
market, c) agricultural production supplied by the informal market, d) 
manufacturing supplied by the informal market, e) services supplied on 
the informal market, f) transportation supplied on the informal market, 
g) labor supplied on the informal market. Rated: 1 (free) to 5 (unfree)  
(www.heritage.org) (H) 
fem_male  Female to Male ratio  Ratio of Female Population, female (% of total) to male (% of total) (C)
elf85 Ethno  Linguistic  Fractionalisation Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985 
computed by Philip G. Roeder (J)
Source: 
A  ICVS http://www.unicri.it/wwd/analysis/icvs/index.php 
B  Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landlocked 
C  WDI www.worldbank.org/data 
D  HDR, UNDP  http://hdr.undp.org/en/ 
E  Djankov et al. (2002)  http://www.jstor.org/pss/2696481   (Table III pp 19-21) 
F  World Governance Indicators 96- http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
G   WBES http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/ 
H  World Database of Happiness  http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm 
I  Corruption Perception Index  http://www.transparency.org/ 
J  Ethno Linguistic Fractionalization http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm 
 